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THE TEMPTING OF ORIGINALISM 
CHRISTOPHER M. DAILEY 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes competing theories of constitutional interpretation. 
Originalism as traditionally understood maintains that proper constitutional 
interpretation involves consulting the historical record for what the words meant 
at the time of ratification. This position is in stark opposition to moral reading, 
which views certain constitutional provisions as embodying broad philosophical 
principles that must be interpreted according to the best understanding of our 
constitutional commitments. Originalism seeks historical truths of constitutional 
meaning whereas moral reading aims primarily toward ethical adjudication and 
constitutional perfection. I track the origins of originalism and its development in 
American legal scholarship while analyzing the interpretive shortcomings and 
ethical dilemmas the theory poses. I ultimately reject originalisms as traditionally 
conceived as antithetical to American constitutional ideals, as blind to the 
teachings of this Nation’s jurisprudential history, and as more theoretically 
problematic than the moral reading it attempts to combat. I further contend that 
the newest wave of originalist thinking, which recognizes broad constitutional 
commitments, is no more than moral reading in disguise. I conclude that moral 
reading is a more defensible theory of constitutional interpretation and that new 
originalists ultimately agree.  
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The Tempting of Originalism 
 
The U.S. Constitution is largely a framework for how to structure our 
government. Most of the provisions deal with the particulars of our democracy; 
election procedures, impeachment powers, administrative duties, describing the 
responsibilities of, and limits upon, each governmental branch. Indeed, without 
the preamble, the Bill of Rights, and the Civil War amendments, the document is 
mainly a guidebook with limited ambiguities.1 If the text as a whole operated in 
such a fairly specific and unambiguous fashion, it might appear obvious that in 
discerning meaning one would look to what the words meant, or what the authors 
meant, at the time the text was written and ratified. This process relegates 
interpretation to historical inquiry, but after all, what better place to look for the 
meaning of “necessary and proper” than those who penned the words or those 
who were present at that time? But of course, the Constitution is not entirely 
authored in such a determinate way. The rights and liberties enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights and Civil War Amendments denote broad philosophical commitments 
that cannot be shackled to historical fact. As a textual, pragmatic, ethical, and 
historical jurisprudential matter,2 constitutional interpretation requires reasoned 
judgment regarding fundamental aspirations of liberty, equality, and justice.3  
																																																								
1 Issues under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
Appointments Clause, the natural born citizen requirement, preemption, and other not-
so-specific phrases would undoubtedly persist. 
2 And indeed some commentators now argue as an original matter. 
3 As I hope to demonstrate in this paper, the reasoned judgment I reference is in the 
Casey sense, consistent with our historical jurisprudential practice, not merely in the 
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In this paper I will argue against originalisms as traditionally conceived as 
antithetical to American constitutional ideals, as blind to the teachings of this 
Nation’s jurisprudential history, and as more problematic than the pragmatic 
moral reading it attempts to combat. The persuasiveness of such arguments is 
not lost on new originalists, and I hope to demonstrate as well that new inclusive 
originalism is in fact an exercise in moral reading. As a textual matter, the 
portions of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights are written in 
exceedingly general terms and include no interpretive guide other than what we 
might infer from the character of the language. The document denotes such 
fundamental liberties as “freedom of speech,” “equal protection of the laws,” the 
freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” and freedom from the deprivation of “life, liberty, and or property, 
without due process of law.” Broad terms necessitate interpretation, so what is 
the most defensible theory? I wish to argue for moral readings, a theory 
championed by Ronald Dworkin and largely exemplified by the Supreme Court 
throughout this Nation’s constitutional history. This approach may take into 
account history or tradition, but does not ignore fundamental notions of justice. 
This approach understands the inherent ambiguous breadth of a sparsely written 
document, while respecting the general principles as such.  
																																																								
abstract sense. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (“Neither 
the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of… “liberty.” 
[A]djudication… may require this Court to exercise its reasoned judgment in determining 
the boundaries between the individual’s liberty and the demands of organized society.”) 
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I. Framers’ Intent and Original Public Meaning 
 
 Originalism rose to prominence due in no small part to the perceived 
activism of the Warren Court.4 To some, the Warren Court seemed all too eager 
to strike down state and federal laws, and notably expanded traditional 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, which some commentators felt was not 
constitutionally mandated.5 Originalism was seen as a potential methodological 
answer, designed to restrain judicial action by tethering constitutional meaning to 
the fixed point at which the document was written and ratified.6 At first, the 
originalist inquiry focused on original intent sometimes referred to as Framers’ 
intent.7 This view drifted into the now all but discredited search for original 
expected applications of constitutional principles.8 In this early stage of 
originalism, it was contended that originalism just is constitutional interpretation.9 
																																																								
4 Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 392 
(2013).  
5 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966).  
6 Whittington, supra note 4 at 393 (“Both the substantive content of the original 
Constitution and the high information requirements for an originalist judge to reach clear 
conclusions about constitutional meaning suggested to early originalists that democratic 
majorities would be empowered to act,” rather than have their laws struck down by an 
unduly active court.)  
7 See, e.g. Robert H. Bork, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (Free Press 1990).  
8 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204 (1980).  
9 See, e.g. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes… and Constitutions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1823, 
1834 (1997) (“[T]he Constitution's meaning is its original public meaning. Other 
approaches to interpretation are simply wrong.”) 
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Thus, the argument goes, a theory not grounded in some sort of original meaning 
cannot claim the title of an interpretive theory.  
 
 The most basic criticism of this ‘old’ originalist theory is its misguided 
quest for subjective intent, both in discerning meaning and intended applications. 
First, old originalism engaged in the hopeless task of establishing a collective 
intent, purporting to transcend various Framers’ intentions.10 Second, the level of 
historical knowledge the constitutional interpreter must possess, and the 
extraordinary collective foresight required of (or assumed of) the Framers 
requires “heroic assumptions.”11 Most fundamentally however, the theory 
presupposes the existence of discoverable historical facts of meaning and or 
expected application. The shift in originalist scholarship from original intent to 
original public meaning is meant to address these concerns, though does so 
unpersuasively.  
 
 It is a semantic diversion at best to claim that shifting the terminology from 
“framers’ intent” to “original public meaning” avoids problems with uncovering 
collective intent.12 The term subject to criticism in ‘collective intent’ is not ‘intent’ 
but rather ‘collective.’ It is not that particular intentions are not discoverable; it is 
rather that subjective intentions are discoverable and are disparate. This leads to 
																																																								
10 Id. at 382.  
11 Whittington, supra note 3 at 381.  
12 There is the slightly more cynical view that the change is a public relations ploy.  
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the potential problem of needing to count “intention-votes”13 in constructing a 
singular collective meaning. Undoubtedly implicit in the phrase “original public 
meaning” is the word “collective” or “common,” because the objective of new 
originalism, much like old originalism, is positive historical fact, just of meaning 
rather than intentions. The change from framers’ collective intent to collective 
public meaning merely shifts what collection of individuals from whom meaning is 
to be derived. This strategy fails to address the core issue that there is potentially 
no such thing as collective intent or meaning, at least concerning the more 
broadly worded and aspirational constitutional provisions. This is of course 
indicative of deep disagreement about our fundamental constitutional 
commitments just as we see today. The shift from Framers’ intent to original 
public meaning is also arguably a more unreliable one, because the collection of 
individuals from whom a positivist fact of meaning must be evinced becomes 
much larger when the public must be evaluated as opposed to a handful of 
Framers. 
 
Second, no less than the search for original intent, the search for original 
public meaning requires comprehensive historical knowledge; so comprehensive 
as to be perhaps only theoretically plausible. To begin to illustrate this point, 
Justice Scalia described the originalist inquiry as requiring “an enormous mass of 
																																																								
13 Whittington, supra note 3 at 382.  
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material.”14 Originalists like Professor Steven Calabresi hold that the originalist 
inquiry can draw a public meaning from myriad sources like “legislative history, 
newspaper accounts, speeches, and contemporary dictionaries.”15 In discussing 
the shortcomings of his own preferred constitutional theory, Justice Scalia aptly 
points out that the originalist inquiry not only relies on a faithful, objective review 
of the “mass of material,” but also relies on the dependability of that material, 
which in some cases is admittedly dubious.16 An originalist is supposed to survey 
these historical sources and conjure up a concrete original public meaning 
applicable to a contemporarily litigated issue? Consider the following: In making 
an originalist case for a broad interpretation of Section One of the 14th 
Amendment as an anti-caste principle not limited to race, capable of extending to 
prohibiting sex discrimination, Professor Calabersi primarily points to articles in 
the Chicago Tribune and Philadelphia North American Gazette from 1866, the 
remarks of various Senators (who are also Framers), and an assumed 
awareness of ratifying state legislatures that a broad anti-caste principle was 
contemplated by certain constituents.17 Is it convincing to argue that because 
some commentators interpreted the meaning of the 14th Amendment as an anti-
caste principle that therefore originalism supports such a proclamation? 
																																																								
14 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser of Two Evils, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 
(1989). 
15 Steven G. Calabresi, Julia T. Rickert, Originalism And Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2011).  
16 Scalia, supra note 14 (“[M]any of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are 
thought to be quite unreliable.”)  
17 Calabresi and Rickert, supra note 15 at 30-36.  
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Originalism offers at least an equally convincing case against the idea that the 
14th Amendment embodies an anti-caste principle as a matter of original public 
meaning, and does not extend beyond racial discrimination.18 If I were inclined to 
buy into originalism, how would I decide which historical account truly represents 
a factual original public meaning?  
 
Moreover, the newspaper articles and additional commentary cited sound 
of an understanding of our constitutional commitments as abstract perfectionist 
principles, not positivist or determinative facts regarding true meaning. The 
Chicago Tribune spoke of “the evils of class legislation,” the “spirit of our 
Government,” and noted that class legislation is “based upon a principle of 
pernicious tendencies.”19 The Philadelphia Gazette described the 14th 
Amendment as it was still in deliberation as “terminating the discriminations 
made against sections and classes and races,” which Professor Calabresi 																																																								
18 See id. at 2 (“It is a truism of modern constitutional law scholarship that originalism, 
the judicial philosophy propounded by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, 
former Judge Robert H. Bork, and former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, cannot 
justify the Supreme Court's sex discrimination cases of the last forty years. Justice 
Scalia confidently announced in a speech at Hastings College of Law recently that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not ban sex discrimination because ‘[n]obody thought it 
was directed against sex discrimination.’ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once wrote that 
‘[b]oldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original understanding, is 
required to tie to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause a command that 
government treat men and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and 
opportunities.’ The received wisdom is that the only kind of discrimination that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to outlaw originally was racial discrimination and 
perhaps discrimination based on ethnic origin. Both Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion 
in United States v. Virginia (VMI) and Justice Scalia's strongly worded dissent in that 
case assume that, as a matter of original meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
ban sex discrimination.”) 
19 Id. at 30.  
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interprets as a “constitutional amendment mandating equality.”20 Comments are 
included from Senator Howard speaking of the 14th Amendment as “do[ing] 
away with… injustice,” and Senator Elliot likewise proclaimed he supported the 
Amendment because “the doctrine it declares is right.”21 Such comments sound 
of justice, injustice, equality, and governmental perfectionism. These are 
philosophical proclamations that one would expect from a moral reader, but they 
are seemingly used to bolster an originalist argument here. It seems to me that 
such an originalist argument is a tacit approval of moral readings, and by mere 
temporal frame the moral readings can be brought under the originalist tent. And 
it is inescapable, as evidenced by Professor Calabresi’s arguments for a broadly 
interpreted 14th Amendment, that philosophical judgments of equality and justice 
produce the more defensible interpretation of the 14th Amendment’s breadth. 
Reaching this conclusion may implicate the irrelevance of originalism as 
conventionally understood. News articles and congressional commentary only 
gets the originalist to the point that some people at the time of ratification were 
considering such and such meaning as the true meaning. That is no place to 
ground a constitutional decision, and that is also the limit of originalist authority.  
 
When I say “the limit of originalist authority” I must confess that I am really 
arguing a larger and more fundamental criticism only touched on above: 
originalism cannot fully produce what it claims to produce. It is a tenet of 																																																								
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 34.  
	 9	
originalism that as a constitutional theory it grounds meaning in positivist 
historical fact.22 But remember that there is arguably a stronger originalist case 
that the 14th Amendment’s reach was originally meant or understood as limited 
to prohibiting explicit racial discrimination.23 And such an interpretation is 
enshrined in the Slaughter-House Cases, where the Supreme Court, in 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, noted, “[i]n the light of the history of 
these amendments… The existence of laws in the States where the newly 
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and 
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause.”24 
Most damningly the Court wrote, “[w]e doubt very much whether any action of a 
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on 
account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this 
provision.”25 Keeping in mind that originalists wish to look at how “lawyers and 
jurists” originally understood constitutional meaning,26 and assuming (correctly I 
hope) that the Supreme Court qualifies as such lawyers and jurists, it seems that 
statements of this sort a mere four years after the 14th Amendment’s ratification 
would be a quite powerful source of historical meaning. Yet, as thoroughly 
																																																								
22 Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism From Old: A 
Jurispurudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 560 (2013) (“Many or most 
originalists… have relied… precisely on the fundamental legal view that the 
constitutional law is determined by, or is entirely a function of, certain unchanging 
historical facts.”)  
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
24 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).  
25 Id.  
26 Whittington, supra note 4 at 380.  
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documented by Professor Calabresi, there are several pieces of evidence 
pointing to a broader original public meaning.  
 
My overall point is this: the originalist inquiry will at best churn up a 
majoritarian belief. That is, the limit of the originalist process is deducing a 
majority viewpoint as to a particular constitutional provision’s original meaning 
over competing minority viewpoints. This limitation in originalist theory is mainly 
due to broad constitutional language and that the phrase “original public 
meaning” is often conflated with “original public understanding.”27 There is the 
cynical position that originalism is merely an exercise in historical cherry 
picking,28 where facts can be gathered and regurgitated in a seemingly 
convincing manner to support a presupposed political ideal. Or less cynically, 
originalists seek to make good faith attempts to discover common understanding, 
whether it be Framers’ intent or public meaning. But barring the seemingly 
impossible instance of an incontrovertibly determinative historical record as to the 
proper application of a constitutional provision, any historical discord reduces 																																																								
27 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 725 (1988) (“[The] relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of 
the language when the Constitution was developed.”)  
28 See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008) 
available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness (Describing the 
“richly deserved” derision of “law office history”: “The judge sends his law clerks 
scurrying to the library and to the Web for bits and pieces of historical documentation. 
When the clerks are the numerous and able clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying 
the assistance of the capable staffs of the Supreme Court library and the Library of 
Congress, and when dozens and sometimes hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have 
been filed, many bulked out with the fruits of their authors' own law-office historiography, 
it is a simple matter, especially for a skillful rhetorician… to write a plausible historical 
defense of his position.”) 
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originalism to the documentation of mere beliefs or opinions. This is 
disingenuous in the sense that originalism claims to derive positivist facts, when 
its limits are far below such a concept. And originalism is disingenuous in a way 
that a moral reading is not. A moral reading merely claims to do what it does; 
make reasoned judgments about the best conceptions of broad constitutional 
commitments within the confines of our jurisprudential tradition. It is a more 
defensible system of adjudication to make reasoned moral judgments regarding 
broad principles, and test the limits through common law adjudication and 
analogizing, than to pretend there are such things as discoverable, original facts 
of constitutional meaning that resolve our contemporary questions. 
 
 Taking a broad step back for a moment, it may be helpful to note a more 
basic, metaphysical divide between originalists and moral readers (or perhaps all 
nonoriginalists). I find that in originalism’s most defensible form, the contention is 
that the Constitution at its basic level is a document, and in discerning any 
document’s meaning one must inquire into what the words on that document 
meant when they were written.29 Thus, in the search for constitutional meaning, 
certainly ambiguities (or broadness I suppose) should not be “resolved by 
construing the Constitution to be the best constitution that it can be,” because 
“interpretation must precede evaluation.”30 So a theory claiming to interpret 
meaning that primarily seeks perfection instead of original public meaning is not 																																																								
29 See generally, Lawson, supra note 9.  
30 Id, at 1834.  
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really a theory of interpretation at all. It is but a political exercise clouded by 
“preconceptions about merit.”31  
 
 This argument is persuasive on its own terms, but it depends on a crucial 
presupposition; that the Constitution, on a fundamental level, is a mere document 
analogous to any statutory law or indeed, as Professor Lawson puts it, a recipe 
for fried chicken.32 This is a metaphysical position on the nature of the 
Constitution, but is it a persuasive one? Is the Constitution a mere document, 
analogous to a recipe that sets out the ingredients and instructions for our 
Republic? A document designed to be strictly adhered to so as to prevent making 
the wrong dish or an undesirable one?33 Or perhaps the Constitution is an 
intentionally broadly worded charter; a framework for constitutional self-
government to be built out over time on the basis of experience and moral 
progress about the best understanding of our constitutional commitments, and 
yet remain a steadfast symbol of this Nation’s founding. Perhaps, as Justice 
Brennan once put it, “the Constitution embodies the aspiration to social justice, 
brotherhood, and human dignity that brought this nation into being.”34 I align with 
Justice Brennan. Such a position on the fundamental nature of the Constitution is 																																																								
31 Id.  
32 Id. (As Professor Lawson in his prose of unmatched entertainment (and I mean that as 
a compliment) writes, “[i]nterpreting the Constitution is… no different in principle than 
interpreting a late-eighteenth-century recipe for fried chicken.”)  
33 Apologies for keeping with the food references. 
34 William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 
presentation at Georgetown University (October 12, 1985), later published in 27 S. TEX. 
L. J. 433 (1986).  
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most in keeping with the text, historical jurisprudential practice, and is 
pragmatically and normatively desirable in a pluralistic democracy. “The 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights solemnly 
committed the United States to be a country where the dignity and rights of all 
persons were equal before all authority… Like every text worth reading, it is not 
crystalline.”35  
 
II. New ‘Inclusive’ Originalism 
 
 The appeal of this constitutional conception is not lost on some 
originalists, which most likely accounts for the recent push toward a “living 
originalism”36 or more “inclusive originalism.”37 Professor Jack Balkin, in his book 
Living Originalism, advocates for a textual understanding of the Constitution that 
is not tied down to concrete historical rules and expectations and recognizes 
abstract principles.38 According to Professor Balkin, the Constitution contains 
“rules,” “standards,” and “principles.”39 And if the text states a general principle, 
we must apply the principle.40 Similarly, Professor William Baude contends that 
an inclusive form of originalism is currently our law and is reflected in numerous 
																																																								
35 Id.   
36 Jack M. Balkin, LIVING ORIGINALISM (Harvard Univ. Press 2011).  
37 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115, COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).  
38 Balkin, supra note 36 at 23-34.  
39 Id. at 6.  
40 Id.  
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precedents previously thought to be antithetical to originalism.41 He argues that 
this form of new originalism allows “for some evolving construction of broad or 
vague language,”42 because words can have “fixed” yet “abstract” meaning that 
can be applied to certain historical transformations.43 And Professor Keith 
Wittington argues that the constitutional text may require faithful application of 
certain embodied principles.44 These are remarkable concessions to moral 
readers’ criticisms of conventional forms of originalism. And I fear that these 
arguments unconsciously (and irreparably) drift into the realm of moral reading.  
 
Consider part of the argument Professor Calabresi makes in support of his 
originalist account of why Loving v. Virginia45 was rightly decided. He argues that 
the Framers of the 14th Amendment designed it to be open to interpretation, 
intentionally employing broad language when speaking of liberty and equality due 
in large part to Supreme Court interpretive methods at the time.46 The contention 
is, since the Framers knew Marbury v. Madison was established law they were 
aware that the Court could apply the 14th Amendment in ways contrary to 
																																																								
41 Baude, supra note 37 at 2352-53.  
42 Id. at 2352.  
43 See id. at 2356-57 (“The standard legal examples are the word ‘unreasonable’ in the 
Fourth Amendment or the words ‘cruel and unusual’ in the Eighth. Even more obvious 
examples might be the reference to ‘property’ in the Fifth Amendment, which can extend 
to new forms of property that did not exist in 1791 (cars, not just carriages), or to ‘armies’ 
in Article I, which can include armies that have modern weaponry and vehicles 
(airplanes, not just muskets).”).  
44 Whittington, supra note 4 at 386.  
45 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
46 Calabresi and Rickert, supra note 15 at 48-49.  
	 15	
expectation, like in McCulloch v. Maryland.47 The Framers also knew, the 
argument goes, that the Court would essentially ignore legislative history in 
applying the amendment.48 Thus, as reflected in the broad language, the 
Framers actually invited applications of the 14th Amendment that seem to go 
against the Framers’ intent as a matter of original meaning.49 This argument 
comes to a rather ironic result. It claims that as a matter of original meaning and 
intent the 14th Amendment sanctioned nonoriginalist interpretation, ensuring 
broader social protections than the Framers and the public originally understood 
or could possibly understand. In other words, in this instance, originalism 
specifically enables nonoriginalism. Perhaps to the chagrin of Professor 
Calabresi, this sort of originalist understanding entails a moral reading, as do all 
forms of inclusive originalism.  
 
 Further consider Professor Baude’s initial characterization of inclusive 
originalism. He points to remarks made by Justices Kagan and Alito, arguing that 
inclusive originalism “is what Justice Kagan meant when she said that 
‘sometimes [the Framers] laid down very specific rules, sometimes they laid 
down broad principles. Either way, we apply what they say, what they meant to 
																																																								
47 Id. at 48. 
48 Id. at 49. 
49 Id. 
	 16	
do. And so, in that sense, we are all originalists.’”50 Is Justice Kagan really 
making a point about originalism here? And a further point that all jurists are 
really originalists? It seems the point is more about broad, indeterminate 
principles. And Justice Kagan is no originalist in any ordinary sense of the term. 
Professor Baude points to Justice Alito describing himself as a “practical 
originalist,” where when applying a “broadly worded” provision, “all you have is 
the principle and you have to use your judgment to apply it.”51 The notion that 
there are broadly worded provisions requiring reasoned judgment is exactly the 
point moral readers make! The major thesis of (at least old) originalism is that 
there are ascertainable facts about original meaning. No need for, and indeed 
thoughtful avoidance of, reasoned judgment. If you must utilize judgment to apply 
a broadly worded principle, it seems you have no concrete original meaning of 
that principle. So functionally what is left? Can it really be called originalism? Or 
is the concession that broadly worded constitutional principles require reasoned 
judgment too great? Far from asking if we are all originalists now,52 the proper 
question may be if we are all moral readers now.53  
 
																																																								
50 Baude, supra note 37 at 2352; Clip: Kagan Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1 (C-
SPAN television broadcast June 29, 2010), http://www.c-span.org/video/?c2924010/clip-
kagan-confirmation-hearing -day-2-part-1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
51 Id. at 2352-53; Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, Am. Spectator (May 2014), 
http://spectator.org/articles/58731/sam-alito-civil-man [http://perma.cc/79PM-JETQ].  
52 Robert W. Bennet & Lawrence B. Solum, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1 
(Cornell Univ. Press 2011).  
53 James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 
1797 (2013). 
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 To hone in on this point let us analyze how Professor Baude justifies 
certain canonical cases under his inclusive originalism. It is widely (and 
persuasively if not determinatively) argued that Brown v. Board of Education54 is 
flatly contradictory to conventional originalist practice.55 An originalist might look 
to congressional debates for any discussion of the issue, but “[v]irtually nothing in 
the congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to prohibit school segregation.”56 Then an originalist might look to the 
ratifiers for whether such a meaning was intended, but “twenty-four of the thirty-
seven states then in the union either required or permitted racially segregated 
schools.”57 It has been confidently stated that if “we [turned] back the clock” to 
ask the Framers of the 14th Amendment “whether the amendment outlawed 
segregation in public schools, they would answer ‘No.’”58 That Brown is 
incompatible with (at least old) originalism has largely been accepted as an 
unfortunate and “inescapable fact.”59  
 
 But Professor Baude recognizes that “any particular [constitutional] theory 
[that] does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided… is 																																																								
54 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
55 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 951-52 (1995) (“In the fractured discipline of constitutional law, there is something 
very close to a consensus that Brown was inconsistent with the original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps at an extremely high and indeterminate 
level of abstraction.”)  
56 Id. at 951.  
57 Id.  
58 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983). 
59 Bork, supra note 7 at 75 -76.  
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seriously discredited.”60 He attempts to re-cast Brown as a decision that, rather 
than defying originalism, actually comports with it. Professor Baude puts great 
weight in Chief Justice Warren’s conclusion that the search for original meaning 
in the 14th Amendment as applied to segregation in schools proved 
“inconclusive.”61 Far from calling this characterization of the original evidence 
disingenuous, cursory, or less than candid,62 and despite the evidence put forth 
in my previous paragraph, Professor Baude welcomes this characterization. The 
inconclusiveness is cast as an insight into the true original meaning of the 14th 
Amendment as a highly abstract and potentially evolving principle.63 Professor 
Baude also maintains that Lawrence v. Texas64 can be brought within his 
inclusive originalism because, as he characterizes it, the Court actively avoided a 
conflict with originalism, opting to settle for ambiguity in the originalist evidence 
much like in Brown.65 This is in spite of Bowers, where the Court declined to 
extend a right of intimate associate to homosexuals specifically because such a 
right is inconsistent with original (and at the time contemporary) meaning and 
understanding.66 Is it a persuasive characterization that both Brown and 																																																								
60 McConnell, supra note 55 at 952; Baude, supra note 37 at 2380.  
61 Baude, supra note 37 at 2381; Brown, surpa note 49 at 489.  
62 McConnell, supra note 55 at 951. 
63 Baude, supra note 37 at 2381.  
64 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
65 Baude, supra note 37 at 2381-82.  
66 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (“Sodomy was a criminal offense at 
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they 
ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 
of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States 
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide 
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. 
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Lawrence thoroughly evaluated original meaning and found the evidence 
inconclusive?67 Or is the more defensible position that the decisions are 
profoundly anti-originalist and border on explicitly declaring themselves as such? 
Conceding Professor Baude’s point as to inconclusiveness, these decisions at 
least proclaim that originalism does not resolve these important questions about 
our constitutional commitments.  
 
 Where Professor Baude really stretches the seams of inclusive originalism 
is his characterization of the recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges68 as an 
originalist opinion.69 Consider this excerpt from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Obergefell:  
 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of 
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy 
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord 
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal 
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.70 
 
 
Does this sound of a reliance on original public meaning? Professor Baude says 
it does. But Justice Kennedy writes of how generations grow to “learn” the 																																																								
(citation omitted). Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such 
conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”).  
67 And wouldn’t that conclusion itself be heretical from the standpoint of conventional 
originalists like Judge Bork or Justice Scalia?  
68 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
69 Baude, supra note 37 at 2382.  
70 Obergefell, supra note 68 at 2598.  
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meaning of broad constitutional promises, and he speaks of “new insights” about 
the fundamental commitment to liberty. This is an espousal of the original 
meaning of Equal Protection and the substantive liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause? To the contrary, Justice Kennedy is engaged in moral reading. 
Rather than look to history for the original scope of the word “liberty” in the Due 
Process Clause, or whether the Equal Protection Clause extends to 
homosexuals as originally understood, Justice Kennedy invokes history to 
demonstrate “the transcendent importance of marriage.”71 He notes that the 
institution of marriage has “evolved over time,” and that this is consistent with “a 
Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new 
generations.”72 Far from an originalist view of history, Justice Kennedy appeals to 
history only to inform his moral reading. It is a reading of learning from 
experience, recognizing moral progress and an evolving contemporary 
consensus. Justice Kennedy is expressing the notion that the constitutional 
principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights and Civil War Amendments are not tied 
down to the historical record of an age long gone, and must be informed by an 
ever-growing and developing moral understanding of our constitutional 
commitments. This is a profoundly anti-originalist sentiment. If Professor Baude’s 
inclusive originalism is inclusive enough to encompass that sentiment and reach 
a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, he is engaged in moral reading as 
well. Nothing could be a clearer statement of fidelity to moral reading, and an 																																																								
71 Id. at 2594. 
72 Id. at 2596. 
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opposition to originalisms, than accepting the notion that constitutional provisions 
“set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements;”73 principles that can 
be molded as our Nation discovers new insights as to the best understanding of 
liberty and equality.74  
 
The temptation for originalists like Professors Calabresi, Baude, 
Whittingtin, and Balkin to bring these decisions within some form of originalism at 
all costs is clear: decisions like Brown, Loving, and Lawrence represent 
fundamental landmarks in American moral evolution that seem all but obvious to 
contemporary eyes. Old originalism received immense criticism for its 
incompatibility with these fundamental decisions.75 But that is the great shame of 
originalism. As a strain of constitutional theory it cannot be squared with the 
greatest jurisprudential achievements in this Nation’s history. And originalism, in 
any form, certainly did not produce the now celebrated results that new 
originalists go to great lengths to sweep under the title of inclusive originalism. 
So, rather than congratulate the Court for its compatibility with the original 
meaning of the Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment as embodying abstract moral 
principles, I would like to welcome new originalists into the moral readers camp.  
 
																																																								
73 Id.  
74 Baude, supra note 37 at 2382. 
75 See James E. Fleming, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION 18 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2015) (“Originalists in the generation after Bork and Scalia are weary of the 
baggage of the prior originalist criticisms of these landmark cases.”)  
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III. New Originalism Requires Moral Reading 
 
Conceding for the moment the originalist case for interpreting the Bill of 
Rights and 14th Amendment broadly as a manifestation of fundamental 
principles, my question is, where do you go from there? An inquiry into original 
public meaning reveals broad aspirational commitments that must be expounded 
over time, so be it, but how does one go about doing that? It seems that new 
inclusive originalism necessitates moral readings. If it is accepted by originalists 
that our fundamental rights and liberties are not tethered to historical practices 
and require reasoned judgment about theoretical principles, the only 
methodology remaining to make such judgments is a philosophical one. It 
requires reasoned judgment on the best understanding of our practice and 
precedents, furthering the moral development of our conceptions of liberty, 
equality, reasonableness, cruel and unusual, due process, and the like. New 
originalists wish to align themselves with the great nonoriginalist cases in history, 
and also wish to avoid morally indefensible results in the future. However, doing 
so drifts irreconcilably into the domain of moral reading. But that’s a good thing!  
 
If originalists are now open to abstract reasoning they can begin to rectify 
the short-comings of the theory such as claiming a vast historical knowledge of 
original public meaning or understanding of a constitutional principle as applied 
to a contemporary issue. They can also remedy the pick-and-choosiness entailed 
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in originalism. For example, I would make a hefty bet that there are very few 
originalists (if any at all) who defend an original understanding of the 1st 
Amendment. It is certainly telling that Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed narrow 
originalist, does not author originalist opinions in the 1st Amendment realm.76 
Perhaps Professor Lawson would argue that as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, original meaning is undoubtedly correct. But I daresay he would 
reject the notion that the 1st Amendment’s original meaning is the optimal social 
policy and would admit that it is certainly a good thing the we have long 
abandoned adherence to it.  
 
IV. The Anti-Originalist Lesson of the 1st Amendment 
 
History reveals that speech protections we take for granted today 
undoubtedly fell beyond the boundary of the 1st Amendment at the time of the 
framing and ratification. Famed originalist Robert Bork pointed out that “[t]he 
framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to 
have been overly concerned with the subject.”77 The Framers and state ratifiers 
saw the 1st Amendment as no barrier to laws punishing “dangerous” speech and 
sedition.78 Thomas Jefferson is said to have held the view that the 1st 
																																																								
76 See e.g. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see also Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).  
77 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles And Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 22 (1971).  
78 Id.  
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Amendment only applies to Congress (as it apparently does textually) leaving the 
States free to suppress whatever speech deemed ripe for suppression.79 Judge 
Bork comes to the conclusion that the meaning of the 1st Amendment, as a 
hastily drafted provision, requires judicial construction80 with the assistance of 
historical tools.81 But one could plausibly argue that the freedom of speech 
enshrined in the 1st Amendment is limited to Blackstonian prior restraint, or 
political speech (as Judge Bork contends), and leaves no doubt as to the 
constitutionality of laws against seditious libel, “bad tendencies,” flag burning, 
public forum censorship, and so on. What can be said without a doubt is that 
current 1st Amendment jurisprudence is in no way originalist in a conventional 
sense, and for good reason. That is, as this Nation built out our practice of self-
government, we have come to appreciate the significance of, and necessity for, 
broad protection for freedom of expression. 
 
Throughout the 20th Century, the Court struggled with its 1st Amendment 
jurisprudence, searching for the outer boundaries of constitutionally protected 
speech largely to no avail. During and after World War I the federal courts faced 
a wave of litigation under the Espionage Act of 1917, which provided: “Whoever, 
																																																								
79 Id.  
80 It is a little amusing that Judge Bork concedes this point when his originalism is 
premised on the notion that Framers’ intentions produce cognizable facts of meaning. 
He then goes on to construct what would be considered today as a horrifically 
underprotective 1st Amendment doctrine – one protecting political speech only – that 
has no recognizable footing in either Framers’ intent or original public meaning.  
81 Bork, supra note 77 at 22-23.  
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when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or 
false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the 
military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its 
enemies and whoever… shall be punished.”82 In Schaffer v. U.S.,83 nine counts 
of violating the Espionage Act were brought against five individuals for offenses 
such as publishing an article entitled “Yankee Bluff,” claiming that the American 
government was lying about the level of military support it could provide for 
England.84 The Court affirmed the convictions under what is known as the “bad 
tendency” test, arguing that such speech has the tendency to make its readers 
unsupportive of the war effort. The Court feared that readers would take the 
statements as truth “and thereby chill and check the ardency of patriotism and 
make it despair of success.”85 
 
As the Court and the Nation came to realize that bad tendency was 
underprotective of speech, it was replaced by the “clear and present danger” test. 
Though, what constituted a clear and present danger and thus justified speech 
suppression was construed broadly. In some cases the test was construed as 																																																								
82 The statute has been revised over the years but can be found now at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 792.  
83 251 U.S. 466 (1920).  
84 Id. at 478 (According to the Court the article reads: “The army of ten million and the 
hundred thousand airships, which were to annihilate Germany, have proved to be 
American boasts, which will not stand washing. It was worthy of note how much the 
Yankees can yell their throats out without spraining their mouths. This is in accord with 
their spiritual quality. They enjoy a capacity for lying, which is able to conceal to a 
remarkable degree a lack of thought behind a superfluity of words.”).  
85 Id.  
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functionally equivalent to bad tendency.86 Clear and present danger was 
construed broadly enough to support imprisonment as a punishment for being a 
member of the Communist Labor Party.87 This doctrine persisted88 until 
Brandenburg v. Ohio89 where the Court considerably sharpened its 1st 
Amendment doctrine, holding that to be proscribable, speech must expressly 
advocate for imminent unlawful action and be likely to produce such action.90 
Since, the 1st Amendment has been expanded to a near absolutist level (limited 
only by the Chaplinsky dicta)91 broadly protecting symbolic conduct,92 anti-
government speech,93 and protecting against content or viewpoint-based 
																																																								
86 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669-71 (1925).  
87 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
88 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding that the clear and present danger 
test is satisfied when Communist Party members declare themselves as such and 
espouse anti-American sentiments).  
89 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
90 Id. at 447.  
91 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It 
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”)  
92 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
93 See R.A.V., supra note 76 at 388 (“To illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only 
that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which 
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for 
example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages. (citation 
omitted). And the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that 
are directed against the President… since the reasons why threats of violence are 
outside the First Amendment… have special force when applied to the person of the 
President. But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats against 
the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities.”)  
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censorship.94 The modern Court even determined that the 1st Amendment is a 
shield against jury imposed tort damages.95 It is no wonder, then, that the 1st 
Amendment is largely considered today as protecting the freedom of 
consciousness, part of a robust commitment to the free exchange of ideas. 
 
You are probably reading this thinking, “good! I’m glad I’m not at risk of 
being jailed for utterances the government happens to declare are detrimental to 
society.” What the foregoing paragraphs reflect is the growing understanding that 
the 1st Amendment, as originally conceived, was woefully underprotective. “Over 
time the Court came increasingly to understand that although each generation’s 
effort to suppress its idea of ‘dangerous speech’… seemed warranted at the 
time, each seemed with the benefit of hindsight an exaggerated and often 
pretextual response to a particular political or social problem.”96 As American 
society progressed and 1st Amendment doctrine developed, the Court came to 
understand the proper “meaning and breadth”97 of speech protection in a 
glowingly unoriginalist manner. Retrospectively, it became plain to the Court that 
bad tendency was wrong (with all of that word’s ethical content), clear and 
present danger without bite was wrong, and it is exceedingly difficult to set the 																																																								
94 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, supra note 76.  
95 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).  
96 Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE 
MODERN ERA 4 (U. of Chi. Press 2001) (Remarks of Professor Stone) (“The Court came 
to understand that there is a natural tendency for even well-meaning citizens, legislators, 
and judges to want to suppress ideas they find offensive or misguided, to inflate the 
potential dangers of such expression, and to under-value the costs of its suppression.”) 
97 Id.  
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outer boundaries of protected speech. At first blush it seems rather arbitrary that 
the Court has shackled itself to Justice Murphy’s Chaplinsky dicta, but it is my 
opinion (I’m sure I’m not the first to think this) that this move is to secure a near-
absolute speech protection, permitting suppression for only the obscene, the 
libelous, and fighting words.  
 
Is this construction consistent with Framers’ intent or original public 
meaning and understanding? Certainly not. Is the development nonetheless right 
as a reflection of this Nation’s development as to the best understanding of our 
constitutional commitment to free speech? Undoubtedly. Decades of moral 
learning on the meaning of justness and liberty clarified a fuller understanding of 
our commitment to free speech. And originalists do not fight the results of this 
moral reasoning; they embrace it as normatively valuable.98 Why is constitutional 
development driven by moral reasoning on the best conception of liberty and 
justice accepted as good, producing right results, in 1st Amendment 
jurisprudence, but is rejected as inscribing nonoriginalist personal philosophies 
onto provisions like the Equal Protection or Due Process clauses? Such a 
position is rather inconsistent.  
 
 
																																																								
98 See R.A.V., supra note 76 (opinion authored by Justice Scalia).  
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V. Is Originalism Really The Lesser Evil?  
 
 As I mentioned previously, old originalism purported to be true 
axiomatically. Interpreting a written document just is an inquiry into original 
meaning. This argument proved unpersuasive and originalists saw the need to 
present normative arguments for why originalism should be the desired method 
of constitutional interpretation. In attempting to do just this, Justice Scalia 
described originalisms as the lesser of two evils, the greater evil being of course, 
nonoriginalisms or in my specific case moral readings.99 Is this so? Two 
prominent arguments that I wish to focus on are that originalisms respect popular 
sovereignty and prevent subjective, politicized adjudication. Both arguments are 
said to be evidence that originalisms are more faithful to the Constitution than 
nonoriginalisms.  
 
 The argument that originalism respects popular sovereignty goes 
something like this: The Constitution derives its legal force from the ratifying 
sovereign, what the people ratified was what they understood they were ratifying 
at the time (i.e. original public meaning or understanding), thus originalism 
pursues the meaning of what We the People ratified. This is said to be preferable 
over a moral reading, which is perceived as revising what We the People 
originally ratified, showing less respect for the rule of law and of sovereignty. This 																																																								
99 Scalia, supra note 14.  
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line of argument has at least two major flaws. First, it assumes an 
authoritarianism of the Framers or ratifiers (depending on the originalist 
theory).100 The argument presumes that the Framers or ratifiers arrogantly 
inscribed the concrete historical rules of their time onto a document that is 
exceedingly difficult to alter, insisting that future generations adhere to their 
understanding of constitutional commitments.101 Second, the sovereignty 
argument ignores the text of what We the People stamped our name on; the 
preamble. There is perhaps no better indication of what We the People originally 
understood about this Nation’s constitutional commitments than the words 
enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution. We the People sought “a more 
perfect Union” based on principles of “Justice,” “Tranquility,” “general Welfare,” 
and “the Blessings of Liberty.” It would be ironic indeed if We the People who 
ratified those words meant to use the rest of the document as a ball and chain, 
temporally limiting the pursuit of those goals.  
 
 As for the contention that originalism prevents subjective adjudication to a 
greater extent than moral reading, this claim is simply false. This argument is the 
cornerstone of originalisms, premised on the notion that any legitimate court 
																																																								
100 Fleming, supra note 53 at 1789.  
101 James E. Fleming, Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 
1354 (1997) (“[I]t is ironic if not absurd that originalists would impose the ‘dead hand’ of 
the past upon us in the name of popular sovereignty.”).  
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“must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the justices.”102 Moral 
reading on its face sounds rather philosophic, but what philosophy is meant to 
divine the true nature of constitutional values and their aspirational goals? “Are 
the ‘fundamental values' that replace original meaning to be derived from the 
philosophy of Plato, or of Locke, or Mills, or Rawls, or perhaps from the latest 
Gallup poll?”103 Moral reading arguably exacerbates the judicial temptation to 
claim that subjective political ideals are “fundamental to our society.”104 Thus, it is 
argued that originalism will lead to “more moderate” results grounded in history 
rather than “extreme result[s]” grounded in moral philosophy.105 This line of 
argument relies on ignoring two fundamental characteristics of originalism. The 
first is the very equal temptation for originalists to construe the historical record to 
achieve a predetermined political result. In criticizing the originalist (and politically 
conservative) majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,106 Judge Posner 
calls the scope of the historical references “breathtaking, but it is not evidence of 
disinterested historical inquiry. It is evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to 
produce snow jobs.”107 The second trait of originalism Justice Scalia ignores is 																																																								
102 Bork, supra note 77 at 6; Scalia, supra note 14 at 863 (“the main danger in judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any 
law— is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”) 
103 Scalia, supra note 14 at 855.  
104 Id. (“It is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political 
values that he personally thinks most important, and those political values that are 
“fundamental to our society.”). 
105 Id.  
106 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Finding a personal right to bear arms in the 2nd Amendment.)   
107 See Posner, supra note 28 (Judge Posner writes: “This is strikingly shown by the 
lengthy discussion of the history of interpretation of the Second Amendment. Scalia 
quotes a number of statements to the effect that the amendment guarantees a personal 
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that a commitment to the distant past is a profoundly anti-progressive value 
choice, i.e. a conservative political stance itself. As Justice Brennan aptly pointed 
out, while originalism claims a detachment from politicization, “the political 
underpinnings of such a [theory] should not escape notice.”108 In resolving textual 
ambiguities as applied to contemporary litigation, to uphold constitutional claims 
only if they were either “within the specific contemplation of the Framers” or can 
be persuasively justified by majoritarian beliefs of original public meaning “is a 
choice no less political than any other; it expresses antipathy to claims of the 
minority to rights against the majority.”109  
 
Let us flesh out these ideas more fully. The notion that originalisms can 
claim more normative value than nonoriginalisms in part due to a foundation in 
the historical record, as opposed to mere philosophizing, tacitly recognizes and 
condones constitutional imperfection. It imagines a judiciary beholden to 
objective fact that must make politically unpopular decisions at best and ethically 
damaging decisions at worst. The charge against nonoriginalists is that theories 
like moral readings entail a perfect Constitution that, not so coincidentally, 
																																																								
right to possess guns--but they are statements by lawyers or other advocates, including 
legislators and judges and law professors all tendentiously dabbling in history, rather 
than by disinterested historians: more law-office history, in other words.”). 
108 Brennan, supra note 34.  
109 Id. (“Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789 specifically 
articulated in the Constitution turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew adaptation 
of overarching principles to changes of social circumstance.”).  
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corresponds with a liberal political philosophy.110 Originalism presumes no such 
perfect conservative Constitution, it is argued, thus originalist jurisprudence is 
more defensible. When an objective historical inquiry finds that the 14th 
Amendment does not extend to women, or finds that segregation and 
antimiscegenation were not considered unconstitutional at the time of ratification, 
originalism would have us accept these results as merely the price to pay for 
grounded, less-politicized adjudication. Even if jurists everywhere find these 
results detestable we are still bound to originalism as the supposed “lesser of two 
evils?” At least we are not aiming at constitutional perfection, right?  
 
This aspect of originalism, indeed in constitutional theory generally, can be 
described as what Christopher Eisgruber dubs the “no pain, no claim” test.111 The 
idea is that a theory of constitutional interpretation cannot be guided by what 
certain jurists decide is a good outcome.112 Political philosophies must give way 
to interpretation at some point; otherwise so-called interpretation will only yield 
predetermined political results, which is not really interpretation at all.113 
Constitutional adjudication therefore must be imperfect because the Constitution 																																																								
110See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L.REV. 353, 358 (1981) 
(Criticizing those who argue that “properly construed, the constitution guarantees against 
the political order most equality and autonomy values which the commentators think a 
twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought to guarantee to its 
citizens.”)  
111 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Test: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation 
between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1993).  
112 Id., see also James E. Fleming, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 210 (U. Chi. 
Press 2006).  
113 Id.  
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itself so clearly is. Along these lines it is argued that moral readers are never 
compelled to break from political ideology because their theory of interpretation is 
not bound by transcendent principle.114 That is, because moral readers would 
always adjudicate in pursuit of a perfect constitution, every decision will have a 
happy outcome and they suffer no ideological pain. No pain, no claim as a viable 
constitutional theory. This is a strong criticism with the goal of preventing 
subjective adjudication. But I am not convinced it changes the analysis on 
whether originalism is the lesser of two evils. First, I would challenge those who 
accept the “no pain, no claim” test to put forth a case in which a conservative 
originalist suffered any ideological hardship because the historical record 
disagreed with that judge’s conservatism. Second, I find no compelling reason to 
exult in constitutional imperfection.115 And third, American law generally resolves 
constitutional injustices through reinterpretation, which jurists then regard as the 
proper interpretation all along.  
 
My first critique is simple and speaks for itself. I am not aware of any case 
in which an originalist judge decided a case in line with a liberal political ideology 
because he or she was compelled by an originalist inquiry to do so. Shackling 
constitutional theory to a bygone era is a politically conservative move. It all but 
ensures that a more progressive agenda cannot flourish. Originalism is also 																																																								
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 211 (“We should embrace a Constitution-perfecting theory of interpretation, 
which proudly aims at happy endings rather than reveling in the imperfections that the 
Constitution might be interpreted to embody.”)  
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apparently ideologically flimsy enough to allow jurists to break from it when it 
suits more politically conservative ends. As discussed above, originalists 
abandon their theory in the 1st Amendment context in favor of a near-absolutist 
approach, rather than a more restrictive original approach.116 This is consistent 
with the conservative trepidation that liberal legislators may impose political 
correctness through laws against hate speech and the like. Perhaps ironically, 
Justice Scalia’s nonoriginalist 1st Amendment jurisprudence supports my second 
criticism of “no pain, no claim;” that constitutional imperfection is preferable to 
perfection. Imperfection breeds injustice. And when injustice is recognized we 
should not simply shrug our shoulders claiming it is the cost of a properly 
imperfect Constitution.117 Justice Scalia is unwilling to allow originalism to hinder 
the free exchange of ideas, and he is right to do so. A more perfect Constitution 
requires a more robust freedom of speech than was originally imagined. Our 
jurisprudence developed in accord with this understanding.  
 
This leads into my third point that constitutional injustices are not typically 
remedied by amendment or otherwise, but by reevaluation. When jurists and 
commentators decry particularly harmful decisions such as Dred Scott, Plessy, 
Korematsu, or Bowers that caused great harm to an unknowable number of 
citizens, it is not typically argued that those cases were rightly decided and our 
																																																								
116 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.  
117 Fleming, supra note 112 at 227.  
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Constitution sanctions this injustice.118 Moreover, such decisions are not 
celebrated as evidence of “pain” that somehow supports the theory underlying 
the decisions’ “claim” to legitimacy and appropriateness. Rather, it is most 
commonly argued that such cases were wrongly decided, and if only the Court 
had properly interpreted the Constitution the grave injustices that followed could 
have been avoided.119 “[I]t would be a shame if constitutional scholars were to 
say that such interpretive tragedies could not have been avoided, or even to 
revel in the evil or injustice that the Constitution might be interpreted to allow, in 
order to avoid being charged with believing that we have a perfect 
Constitution.”120 Constitutional adjudication bends toward perfection. This is true 
as an historical matter and should be true as an interpretive matter as well.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
If the battle between originalisms and nonoriginalisms is essentially over 
which theory is more faithful to the Constitution, it is clear that originalism 
misunderstands the concept of fidelity. Originalisms assume that the claim of 
fidelity to the Constitution is rooted in a (perceived) greater theoretical 
defensibility. I contend that the claim to fidelity lies in ethically defensible 
adjudication. Where my position differs from the originalist assumption is that we 
																																																								
118 Id. at 225.  
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have different answers as to what (or whom) we owe fidelity. Originalism 
presumes that we owe fidelity to the Constitution as a document and as originally 
understood, while I find that fidelity lies with the People. Constitutional 
interpretation should foster the People’s fidelity to the Constitution, rather than to 
the Constitution as a document while disregarding the People’s fidelity or lack 
thereof. A Constitution that sanctions, even requires, injustice deserves no 
fidelity. The Constitution earns the People’s fidelity and the throne of highest law 
through its moral defensibility. A theory of interpretation that produces ethically 
indefensible results cannot be said to be more faithful to the document it is 
interpreting, for that professed faithfulness is precisely what is eroding the 
reasons to be faithful in the first place. New inclusive originalism tacitly 
understands this. Its acceptance of reasoned judgment regarding broad 
constitutional commitments aims to avoid ethical embarrassment through 
embracing the moral reading I advocate.  
 
The moral reading I put forth is not philosophy in the abstract. 
Constitutional moral readings are bound by our deeply rooted jurisprudential 
practice, particularly reasoned judgment as to the best conception of this Nation’s 
constitutional commitments, rather than boundless philosophical opining. It is a 
theory that encourages thoughtful deliberation as to our constitutional 
aspirations, and evaluates our history’s fidelity (or lack thereof) to those 
aspirations. As Justice Brennan once put it, the Constitution “committed the 
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United States to be a country where the dignity and rights of all persons were 
equal before all authority,” but “[i]n all candor we must concede that part of this 
egalitarianism in America has been more pretension than realized fact.”121 Moral 
reading encourages us to be critical of historically under-realized commitments to 
our enshrined principles in the hope that our constitutional culture develops, 
consistent with our jurisprudential practice, on the basis of experience and moral 
progress about the best understanding of our constitutional aspirations. Such an 
approach is not only substantially grounded in articulated external principles, it is 
most consistent with our jurisprudential tradition and has produced the greatest 
constitutional triumphs in our history.  
 
In conclusion, it is not so clear that moral reading is a greater interpretive 
evil than originalism on a theoretical or political level. But it is certainly clear that 
originalisms as conventionally understood work a greater evil on fundamental 
notions of justice as evidenced by the general agreement that originalism cannot 
account for the most significant jurisprudential achievements in American history. 
Such is the impetus behind the new originalist movement, straining to bring those 
cases within its boundaries while recognizing a commitment to abstract (and 
even evolving) principles. The inclusive originalist recognition of the interpretative 
and normative value found in moral reading stands for the clear principle that “[i]t 
is the very purpose of a Constitution - and particularly of the Bill of Rights - to 																																																								
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declare certain values transcendent.”122 That “[o]ne cannot read the [Constitution] 
without admitting that it embodies substantive value choices… To remain faithful 
to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text 
must account for the existence of these substantive value choices, and must 
accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern 
circumstances.”123 History must not be used to stifle constitutional development, 
but rather to expound on the ethical erudition of the American people as the best 
understanding of our constitutional commitments evolves. If moral readers and 
new originalists now agree on this point, our only difference is a lexical one.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
BU. L. REV.    BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
COLOM. L. REV.  COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
DUKE L. J.   DUKE LAW JOURNAL 
FORDHAM L. REV.   FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 
GEO. L. J.   GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 
HARV. L. REV.  HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
IND. L. J.    INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 
N.Y.U. L. REV.  NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
S. CT.    SUPREME COURT REPORTER 
TEX. L. J.    TEXAS LAW JOURNAL 
TEX. L. REV.    TEXAS LAW REVIEW 
U. CIN. L. REV.   UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 
U.S.     UNITED STATES REPORTS (when citing cases) 
VA. L. REV.    VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
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